The question of Sabah’s sovereignty is often framed through competing historical and genealogical claims. However, a careful reading of the historical and legal record shows that the Sulu Sultanate’s control over Sabah was never absolute.
This history has been brought to the forefront by the revival of the Sabah Dispute by the armed invasion of the so-called Royal Sulu Force during the Lahad Datu Incident of 2013. This was followed by a lengthy and costly lawsuit financed by litigation funder Therium that sought to seize nearly $15 billion of Malaysia’s assets in Europe, an effort that was only defeated in December of 2025. Both efforts were led by supposed descendants of the Sulu Sultanate.
Do their claims of sovereignty over Malaysia’s easternmost state, arguments seized on by international lawyers and litigation funders to plunder Malaysia’s wealth, hold any water?
The evidence points to three consistent conclusions: the limited and contested nature of Sulu’s historical authority in North Borneo, the erosion of its sovereignty by the early twentieth century, and the decisive role of decolonization and self-determination in 1963.
The origins of Sulu’s claim are tied to the Brunei civil war involving Sultan Muhammad Ali, Sultan Abdul Hakkul Mubin, and Sultan Muhyiddin. In this context, parts of North Borneo now known as Sabah were said to have been ceded to Sulu in exchange for military assistance.
However, this transfer does not demonstrate sustained or centralized sovereignty. At most, it reflects the creation of a protectorate—an autonomous territory subject to the influence and control of an imperial power, not the creation of a unified Sulu-administered territory.
“This transfer does not demonstrate sustained or centralized sovereignty. At most, it reflects the creation of a protectorate.”
In some traditions, descendants of Sultan Muhammad Ali Barakat-Muhiddin are said to have maintained authority in parts of northern and eastern Borneo. This interpretation is often highlighted as evidence that the East Coast of Sabah belonged to a Brunei-Borneo-oriented lineage rather than to the later Philippine-centered Kiram line of Sulu.
One example are claims of the so-called “Triple Sultanate” structure, consisting of Marudu in the north, Magindara in the center, and Tirun in the south, each ruled by descendants of the Bornean Barakat-Muhiddin line. Each exercised some autonomy with Sulu control and taxation only possible through their cooperation.
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While these traditions require cautious handling due to limited documentary confirmation, they still point to an important conclusion: control over the east coast of North Borneo was not culturally or politically identical to the Sulu core.
“Control over the east coast of North Borneo was not culturally or politically identical to the Sulu core.”
As such, authority in eastern Sabah remained fragmented and heavily dependent on the mediation of local middlemen, and only loosely connected to Sulu’s central administration. The region appears to have maintained distinct local identities, leadership systems, and historical trajectories rooted in Borneo itself.
Colonial Powers, Self-Determination, and the End of the Sulu Sultanate
Of course, in 1878, the growth of British power in the region culminated in the ceding of Sabah to the British North Borneo Chartered company. While some dispute the language of the agreement, an additional treaty in 1903 sealed British control of Sabah and further nearby islands.
Perhaps an even more crucial turning point came with the Carpenter Agreement of 1915, under which Sultan Jamalul Kiram II relinquished temporal authority to the United States.
This development is decisive for modern sovereignty claims. After 1915, the Sulu Sultanate no longer functioned as a sovereign political entity in the conventional sense. While symbolic or genealogical claims persisted, the institutional basis for exercising territorial sovereignty had effectively disappeared. This significantly undermines any argument that later claims over Sabah could rest on an unbroken line of sovereign authority.
Former Philippines Chief of the Supreme Court Artemio V. Panganiban has highlighted this very point in an article arguing for peaceful dialogue over the Sabah dispute. Sovereignty refers to a state’s authority to maintain public order, regulate social relations, and govern rights over property within its territory. This is something the Sulu Sultanate struggled to realize even in its heyday. Instead, Panganiban argues, the Sulu claim to Sabah is one of ownership, referring to the right to control property—rights defined by the entity holding sovereignty and effective control, Malaysia.
“Panganiban argues, the Sulu claim to Sabah is one of ownership, referring to the right to control property—rights defined by the entity holding sovereignty and effective control, Malaysia.”
This sovereignty was most clearly confirmed during the decolonization process of 1962–1963. The UN-backed Cobbold Commission found clear and decisive support among the population of North Borneo for joining Malaysia.
Local actors played an important role in this transition. Leaders such as Tun Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun supported Sabah’s integration into Malaysia and became central figures in its postcolonial governance.
“The UN-backed Cobbold Commission found clear and decisive support among the population of North Borneo for joining Malaysia.”
Under modern international law, self-determination carries greater legal weight than historical or dynastic claims, particularly those made by colonial and imperial despots. Regardless of earlier regional ties, sovereignty ultimately rests on the consent of the population. The recent escalations in the Sabah dispute have only drawn further statements from Sabah’s local leaders reaffirming the state’s will to remain within the Malaysian Federation.
Taken together, the evidence does not support the claim that the Sulu Sultanate holds modern sovereignty over Sabah if indeed it ever exercised anything more than loose control over a “Triple Sultanate” protectorate.
REFERENCES
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Zaifuddin Md Rasip, Amir Hudhaifah Hamzah, Mohd Nur Hidayat Hasbollah Hajimin, Mohd Solleh Ab Razak, Sarip Adol, & Syamsul Azizul Marinsah. (2025). The historical development of Islam and converts in Sabah, Malaysia: From the 14th century to the official designation of Islam as the state religion. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 15(3), 1–15. https://www.researchgate.net

